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Abstract Contingent valuation method is commonly used in the field of health eco-
nomics in an attempt to help policy makers in their policy-making decision process.
The use of the double-bounded dichotomous choice format results in a substantial
gain in statistical efficiency over the single-bounded dichotomous choice format.
Yet, there is internal inconsistency with a downward mean shifting in the second
responses. Using data from a community-based health insurance survey, this paper
aims at testing whether double certainty calibration reduces internal inconsistency in
a double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey. Results suggest
that double calibration significantly reduces internal inconsistency while maintaining
the efficiency gain arising from the double-bounded format.
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1 Introduction
Contingent valuation (CV) method typically remains the most widely used method for
assessing consumer preferences for non-market goods and services. Also notable is the
use of CV to value marketed goods and services for which no established market exists
(see e.g., Abdullah and Jeanty 2011). The value obtained from CV survey is of interest
for policy-making decisions that are based on cost-benefit analysis. Thus, researchers
must estimate without any bias the value that respondents attach to a particular good
or policy. In an attempt to reach this goal, the single-bounded dichotomous choice
(SBDC) and the double-bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC) formats have been
prominently used over the past years.
The use of the open-ended format in the form “how much are you willing to pay
for X (or for policy A)?” has been rescinded in favor of the SBDC format in the
form “are you willing to pay Y dollars for X (or for policy A)?” because the lat-
ter is incentive compatible and mimics behavior in regular markets where people
usually purchase or decline purchase a good at the posted price (Arrow et al. 1993;
Bishop and Heberlein 1979). However, the SBDC format provides less information
about each respondent’s willingness-to-pay (WTP), resulting in less efficiently esti-
mated WTP measures. In order to obtain more information about respondents’ WTP,
Carson et al. (1986) developed the DBDC approach, which consists of asking another
yes/no question, where a higher or a lower bid amount is offered depending on the first
response. A few years later, Hanemann et al. (1991) demonstrated that DBDC is more
efficient than the SBDC format. Since then, the DBDC format has been the mainstay
in CV surveys. Yet, some skepticism remains largely because empirical applications
have shown that WTP amounts from the first and the second responses were not driven
by the same underlying preferences, with the former being significantly higher than
the latter (McFadden 1994; Cameron and Quiggin 1994; Kanninen 1995; Herriges and
Shogren 1996; Bateman et al. 2001, 2008; Burton et al. 2003). This is known as inter-
nal inconsistency emerging primarily from the second responses. In fact, McFadden
(1994, pp. 705–706) stated that the double referendum elicitation format is internally
inconsistent, causing some practitioners to abandon such elicitation format. Using data
obtained from a community-based health insurance (CBHI) survey, this paper aims at
testing whether the double certainty calibration reduces the internal inconsistency.
Calibration has been one of the prominent techniques used in CV surveys to mitigate
hypothetical bias, a tendency of respondents to state WTP amounts different from
what they would declare in real settings (e.g., Champ et al. 1997). To the best of our
knowledge, it has never been used to grapple with the issue of internal inconsistency in
DBDC. Our results strikingly indicate that the double certainty calibration is effective
at reducing the discrepancy between the welfare estimates from the single- and double-
bounded models estimated from the same dataset while the efficiency gain arising from
the follow-up question is maintained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background
on internal inconsistency in the DBDC context. Section 3 presents the methodology
used, while Sect. 4 describes the survey design and data. Section 5 reports the empirical
results of the study. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
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2 Internal inconsistency and double certainty calibration
Several conjectures have been put forward in an attempt to explain the reasons under-
pinning internal inconsistency in the DBDC approach. Since the results of the CV
surveys are not consequential, people may invest little effort in the valuation task and
bear a range of values in mind rather than a single point (Guzman and Kolstad 2007).
Hanley et al. (2009) argued that respondents would prefer to state a range of values
instead of a point estimate because they are unsure about the value they place on
the proposed good or policy. This uncertainty could lead to an overestimation of the
mean WTP and a behavioral inconsistency (Murphy et al. 2005; Mahieu et al. 2012).
Flachaire and Hollard (2007) maintained that the existence of a range may be the
culprit for the internal inconsistency. Premised on the coherent arbitrariness principle,
their model suggests that respondents uncertain about their true WTP are prone to
anchoring effects.
The government wastage model was proposed by Carson et al. (1994) to explain the
downward mean shifting in the second responses. In this model, the respondents saying
“yes” to the initial bids for the provision of a public good might conceive of the higher
follow-up bids as an attempt by the government to collect more funds than needed to
cover the provision of the good and will say “no” to the follow-up bids since perceiving
it as a waste. By the same token, respondents saying “no” to the initial bids might view
the lower follow-up bids as an indication that the good being valued is of lower quality,
and thus they will answer “no” to the follow-up bids. Another possible explanation is
the strategic behavior model (Mitchell and Carson 1989) where the respondents answer
the first questions truthfully but answer the second ones strategically. Individuals would
tend to lower the bids by rejecting any additional bids proposed by the researcher. In
order to avoid this strategic behavior while gaining efficiency, Cooper et al. (2002)
proposed the one and one-half bound approach. Bateman et al. (2008) showed that the
respondents were unfamiliar with the institutional procedures of the DBDC and they
were surprised by the follow-up questions. Watson and Ryan (2007) found that, unlike
respondents who felt uncertain about their responses to the first valuation question,
respondents who felt certain are more likely to respond the second question in a more
consistent way. A scale ranging from 1 to 5 was implemented to assess the degree
of certainty, where respondents providing a score of 5 were considered certain about
their WTP, while the other participants were considered uncertain.
In the current study, we use the follow-up certainty questions (FCQ) to calibrate the
respondent’s WTP for both the first and the follow-up bids. As a result, we term our
approach double certainty calibration. “Yes” respondents are asked how sure they are
about their answers on a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 means “very uncertain”
and 10 “very certain.” Following Ethier et al. (2000) and Poe et al. (2002), we set
a threshold of 7 out of 10 to decide whether to recode a “yes” to a “no” response.
Thus, for the FCQ, all “yes” answers not receiving a score of 7 or higher are recoded
as “no.” This rule is also applied to the follow-up bid of the second question. The
rationale underlying the double certainty calibration is that respondents might be able
to better assess the good being valued when they are given the opportunity to revise
their answers. It may also be the case that a reduction in WTP as a result of calibration
may lead to a reduction in the internal inconsistency in response patterns.
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3 Econometric methods
Following Hanemann (1984), let v (p, q, y, s, ε) be the indirect utility function of
the individual, where p represents the prices of the market goods, q the non-market
good, y the respondent’s income, s the socio-demographic characteristics such as
age, income, and gender, and ε the stochastic component of preferences. Via the
questionnaire, the respondent is confronted with the possibility of a change from an
initial state (the status quo) to the proposed alternative (that is from q0 to q1  q0). In
the status quo, the utility function of the respondent is given by v(p, q0, y, s, ε). When
a change from the status quo q0 to the proposed alternative occurs, the utility function
in the final state, q1, is equal to v(p, q1, y − A, s, ε), with A being the proposed
payment offered to the respondent. The respondent will answer “yes” to the offered
bid if v(p, q1, y − A, s, ε) ≥ v(p, q0, y, s, ε) and “no” otherwise. The model heavily
relies on probabilities because the stochastic component of the utility function is not
observable. Hence,
Pr {response is “yes”} = Pr
{
v
(
p, q1, y − A, s, ε
)
≥ v
(
p, q0, y, s, ε
)}
(1)
By using the compensating variation measure, the quantity C satisfies:
v
(
p, q1, y − C, s, ε
)
= v
(
p, q0, y, s, ε
)
,
Thus, solving for C = C (p, q0, q1, y, s, ε) yields the respondent’s maximum WTP
for the change from q0 to q1.
Hence, an equivalent condition to (1) is:
Pr {response is “yes”} = Pr
{
C
(
p, q0, q1, y, s, ε
)
≥ A
}
, (2)
In other words, respondents will say “yes” when their maximum WTP for the change
from q0toq1 exceeds the proposed bid A. Let Gc (•) denote the cumulative distribution
function of C , and gc (•) the corresponding density function. Then (2) becomes:
Pr {response is “yes”} = 1 − Gc (A) , (3)
The form of the function Gc (A) and the distributional assumption of the stochastic
component of the utility function determine the econometric model to be used. If the
Gc (A) follows a probit standard distribution and the model to estimate is linear, then
the expected mean WTP is:
μSBDC = −α
β
, (4)
where α is the intercept and β the coefficient on the bid level representing the esti-
mated marginal utility of income. Other socio-demographic variables are important
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for benefit transfer and policy analysis but not needed for the tests implemented in the
paper.
In order to obtain more precise welfare estimates, we consider the DBDC format.
For the same level of the newly proposed CBHI, the DBDC protocol, as previously
noted, entails posing two successive questions requesting a “yes” or “no” from the
respondents. A positive response to the first bid question leads to a higher second bid
(twice the first bid); the converse holds in the case of negative answer (half of the
first bid). Thus, there are four possible responses: “yes–yes”; “yes–no”; “no–yes”;
and “no–no.”
With the DBDC data at hand, we estimate the interval data probit model drawing
upon Hanemann et al. (1991). In this model, the mean/median WTP estimates and the
dispersion parameters are assumed to be the same across equations or questions and
the coefficient of correlation between the random components in the two equations is
assumed to be equal to one.
Let A1 denote the first bid and A2 the second bid. The bounds on the WTP are:
A1 ≤ WTP < A2 for the “yes–no” responses;
A1 > WTP ≥ A2 for the “no–yes” responses;
WTP ≥ A2 for the “yes–yes” responses;
WTP < A2 for the “no–no” responses;
The general form of the double-bounded model is:
WTPi j = μi + εi j , (5)
where WTPi j represents the amount the j th respondent is willing to pay, and i = 1, 2
represents the first and the second answers, while μ1 and μ2 correspond to the means
for the first and the second responses. Based on the assumption that μ = μ1 = μ2,
WTP for the j th individual can be written as:
WTP j = μ + ε j (6)
With the error term assumed to be normally distributed, the j th contribution to the
likelihood function is:
L j (μ|A) = Pr
(
A2 − μ  ε j  A1 − μ
)Y N
. Pr
(
μ + ε j  A2
)Y Y
× Pr
(
μ + ε j ≺ A2
)N N
. Pr
(
A1 − μ  ε j  A2 − μ
)NY
,
where
Y Y = 1for a “yes–yes” answer, 0 otherwise
NY = 1for a “no–yes” anwser, 0 otherwise;
Y N = 1for a “yes–no” anwser, 0 otherwise;
N N = 1for a “no–no” anwser, 0 otherwise;
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We derive inferential statistics for both μSBDC and μDBDC by the Delta method. How-
ever, since confidence intervals obtained from the Delta method are symmetric around
the mean, hence not appropriate (Park et al. 1991), the 95 % confidence intervals
for mean WTP estimates are constructed by the Krinsky and Robb (1986) Krinsky
and Robb (1986) Monte Carlo simulation, which we implement in Stata using the
user-written command wtpcikr (Jeanty 2007).
When comparing mean WTP from SBDC(μSBDC) and mean WTP from DBDC
(μDBDC), it is expected that the former be larger than the latter due to internal incon-
sistency. Our primary concern is to investigate whether calibration reduces the gap
between mean WTP from the SBDC and mean WTP from DBDC. We address this
issue by carrying out a battery of statistical tests. First, we examine whether the use
of calibration technique significantly reduces the mean WTP from both SBDC and
DBDC. Accordingly, the following two tests are implemented:
H0 :  = μSBDCNC − μSBDCC ≤ 0
H1 :  = μSBDCNC − μSBDCC > 0 (7)
where μSBDCNC and μSBDCC are the mean WTP for the SBDC without calibration and
with calibration, respectively.
H0 :  = μDBDCNC − μDBDCC ≤ 0
H1 :  = μDBDCNC − μDBDCC > 0 (8)
where μDBDCNC and μDBDCC are the mean WTP for the DBDC without calibration
and with calibration, respectively.
Furthermore, we carry out a one-tailed difference in difference test by testing the
following null hypothesis:
H0 :  =
(
μSBDCNC − μDBDCNC
) − (μSBDCC − μDBDCC
) ≤ 0
H1 :  =
(
μSBDCNC − μDBDCNC
) − (μSBDCC − μDBDCC
)
> 0 (9)
Testing the null hypothesis in Eq. (9) entails testing whether the discrepancy between
mean WTP from SBDC and mean WTP from DBDC is lower with calibration
than without calibration. Performing these tests, particularly the test in Eq. (9),
is relatively complex given that the correlation between the first and the second
answers renders non-independent the values obtained for the two elicitation ques-
tions. Hence, the covariance between WTP measures from the initial and the follow-
up questions is different from zero, precluding the use of conventional paired t
tests.
Bootstrap technique remains an effective way to side-step this issue and to undertake
the test (Efron 1993). For both SBDC and DBDC, calibrated and uncalibrated, we
simulate mean WTP using 50,000 replications and the results for each simulation are
saved to a dataset.1 We then load and merge the datasets and calculate the difference
1 We use the user-written-wtpcikr-command to perform the Monte Carlo simulations and save the results
to datasets (Jeanty 2007).
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in mean WTP as in Eqs. (7) to (9). Once the difference in mean WTP is calculated,
the achieved significance level (ASL) is also calculated to test the corresponding null
hypothesis. The lower the ASL relative to conventional significance levels, the more
likely the internally inconsistent patterns in responses are reduced by the use of the
double certainty calibration.
4 Survey design and data
The good being valued in the study is the provision of CBHI to the rural households
in Bandjoun, a province located in West of Cameroon. Given that most rural house-
holds are excluded from formal insurance, CBHI has emerged as a concept and a
strategy to reach the poor living in rural areas with adequate health care services.
Organized and managed in a participatory manner, CBHI are small scale, voluntary
health insurance programs, (Tabor 2005). CBHI is now adopted in many developing
countries (see for instance Dong et al. 2003; Dror et al. 2007; Ataguba et al. 2008;
Asenso-Okyere et al. 1997). Recently, policymakers in Cameroon have adopted a
health strategic plan to promote CBHI. The plan aims at: (a) putting in place CBHI
in each health district by 2015 and (b) covering at least 40 % of the population by
the CBHI by 2015. Under the micro-insurance innovation facility housed at the Inter-
national Labor Organization’s Social Finance Program and supervised by the Euro-
pean Development Research Network, face-to-face interviews were conducted in 2009
in six villages on a sample of 369 rural household heads selected by a two-stage
cluster sampling technique. In an attempt to conduct a state-of-the art CV, guidance
provided in Arrow et al. (1993), Carson (2000), and Whittington (2002) were fol-
lowed.
In order to minimize interviewer bias, we ensured that the numerators were well
trained and were randomly assigned to the respondents as done in Abdullah and Jeanty
(2011). Another source of concern was hypothetical bias arising from a respondent’s
stated WTP being lower or higher than her true WTP. In order to avoid hypothetical
bias, we took pain in presenting the scenario to the respondents as real as possi-
ble by reminding them of their budget constraint and of the possibility of exclu-
sion due to a failure to honor their payment on time. The scenario explained to
the respondents the concept of CBHI, the operation of CBHI, the benefits asso-
ciated to CBHI, and the premium that they would have to pay to receive such
benefits.
Focus groups and pre-tests conducted helped determine the following initial bids:
250, 350, 450, 550, 650, and 800 CFA francs. As a standard practice in the DBDC
question format, the follow-up bids were twice (respectively half) the initial bids
if the respondent answered “yes” (respectively “no”) to the first valuation question.
Furthermore, the FCQ were included after both the initial and the follow-up bids. The
FCQ asked the “yes” respondents to rate on a 10-point numerical likert scale ranging
from 1 “very uncertain” to 10 “very certain” how sure they felt that they would actually
pay for the CBHI. This self-reported certainty level was used to re-code responses to
the WTP question and to provide an estimate of mean WTP similar to the actual WTP.
Parallel to Ethier et al. (2000), Poe et al. (2002), Ready et al. (2010), and Morrison and
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Fig. 1 The aggregate demand curve for CBHI
Brown (2009) a threshold 7 out of 10 was set. Then, all “yes” answers were recoded
as “no” if the score was strictly inferior to 7.2
Figure 1 conspicuously portrays that both the uncalibrated and the calibrated first
yes responses give rise to a downward sloping Hicksian demand function, indicating
that insurance is a normal good: as the premiums increase, the households are less
willing to pay for CBHI.
5 Results
We begin with the uncalibrated results. The first panels in Tables 1 and 2 provide
uncalibrated mean WTP estimates from SBDC and DBDC. As can be seen, there is
downward mean shifting in the second responses (μSBDC > μDBDC). Indeed, there is
clear pattern of internal inconsistency in the uncalibrated responses from the respon-
dents. This finding is consistent with previous researches (Hanemann et al. 1991;
Cameron and Quiggin 1994; Herriges and Shogren 1996; DeShazo 2002; Bateman et
al. 2008).
Following Loomis and Ekstrand (1998), we compare the efficiency gain of the
DBDC over the SBDC. The ratio of the confidence interval to the mean WTP is
used as a relative measure of efficiency of WTP estimates (CI/mean = (Upper bound
– lower bound)/meanWTP). The lower the ratio the higher the efficiency. A close look
at the mean WTP estimates in Tables 1 and 2 confirms that the ratio of the confidence
interval to the mean WTP of DBDC is lower than that of the SBDC (0.16 < 0.68),3
indicating that DBDC yields more efficient welfare estimates than does SBDC.
The first panel in Table 3 shows a difference between μSBDC and μDBDC
( = 90.97). Nevertheless, it is possible to use the FCQ to calibrate respondents’
2 Using the threshold level 8 and above would result in very few yes responses. This same pattern of data
was found in the study of Whitehead and Cherry (2007) where the certainty level of 7 was used.
3 The DBDC yields four times efficiency gains as compared to the SDBC.
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Table 1 Mean willingness to pay for SBDC
Statistic Value without calibration Value with calibration
μSBDC 1064.95 975.49
(140.74) (179.41)
Krinsky–Robba [875.43 1598.91] [755.43 2056.21]
CI/Mean 0.68 1.33
a Confidence interval of the mean WTP is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations on 50,000 draws
The standard errors are in brackets computed by the Delta method
Table 2 Mean willingness to
pay for DBDC Statistic Value without calibration Value with calibration
μDBDC 973.98 935.72
(38.13) (94.07)
Krinsky–Robb [ 901.70 1052.87] [ 753.49 1127.12]
CI/Mean 0.16 0.40
WTP and also reduce the discrepancy between the mean WTP calculated from the
SBDC and DBDC and maintain the efficiency gain as well.
In fact, as it is conspicuous in Table 3, the use of double certainty calibration reduces
the discrepancy between the mean WTP from the SBDC and DBDC by about 60 %
( = 39.77). Furthermore, for both SBDC and DBDC, we test whether calibration
makes a difference. As shown in Table 4, the null hypothesis is rejected at the one
percent significant level (p value is 0.003 and 0.005 for SDBDC and DBDC, respec-
tively). In other words, mean WTP from SBDC and mean WTP from DBDC are both
reduced when calibration is applied. In fact, before the double calibration, the mean
WTP of SBDC and DBDC were 1064.95 CFA francs and 973.98 CFA, respectively;
while these means become 975.49 CFA francs and 935.72 CFA francs, respectively,
when the calibration is implemented.
Finally, Table 3 clearly shows that the discrepancy between mean WTP estimate
from SBDC and mean WTP estimate from DBDC is smaller with calibration (39.77)
than without (90.97). We test whether the difference is statistically lower with cal-
ibration. As shown in Table 4, the test resoundingly rejects the null hypothesis that
the discrepancy is higher with calibration (p value=0.005). This result substantiates
our claim that the double certainty calibration is effective at reducing the internal
inconsistency in the DBDC approach.
Our results also suggest that even with calibration, the DBDC approach yields more
efficient WTP estimates. For instance, in Tables 1 and 2, the ratio of the confidence
interval to the mean WTP of DBDC is lower than that of SBDC (0.40 < 1.33). In
other words, confidence intervals around the mean WTP estimates of DBDC are still
tighter than the one around the mean WTP estimates of SBDC. In theory, calibrating
the responses of respondents must not affect the efficiency gain of the DBDC over
SBDC though the central tendency could be affected. As Alberini et al. (2003) argued,
there is no reason to believe that allowing uncertain responses will affect the efficiency
of welfare estimates. Our finding echoes this contention.
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Table 3 Difference between
mean WTP for SBDC and
DBDC
Statistic Value without
calibration
Value with
calibration
μSBDC 1064.95 975.49
(140.74) (179.41)
μDBDC 973.98 935.72
(38.13) (94.07)
 = μSBDC − μDBDC 90.97 39.77
Table 4 The achieved
significance level of the test of
internal inconsistency
Test P value
H0 :  = μSBDCNC − μSBDCC ≤ 0 0.003
H1 :  = μSBDCNC − μSBDCC > 0
H0 :  = μDBDCNC − μDBDCC ≤ 0 0.005
H1 :  = μDBDCNC − μDBDCC > 0
H0 :  = μSBDCNC − μDBDCNC− μSBDCC − μDBDCC ≤ 0
0.005
H1 :  = μSBDCNC − μDBDCNCμSBDCC− μDBDCC > 0
6 Conclusions
The use of CV method in the health sector is gaining popularity as policymakers may
capitalize on results from the CV survey to improve the well-being of their populations.
Over the past decades, there has been a shift from SBDC to DBDC because of the
statistical efficiency gains from the DBDC. Nevertheless, the DBDC format has been
criticized on the ground that responses from the first question are inconsistent with
those from the second question, causing a downward mean shifting in WTP estimates
derived from the latter. Empirical evidence from previous studies has confirmed this
internal inconsistency in DBDC.
Using a CBHI CV survey, the purpose of this paper was to investigate whether
applying certainty calibration to both initial and follow-up bids reduces this internal
inconsistency. To the best of our knowledge, this study was the first to use certainty
calibration to contend with the issue of internal inconsistency in the DBDC approach.
Consistent with previous CV studies, we find a substantial difference between uncal-
ibrated SBDC and DBDC WTP estimates. Using parametric bootstrap technique, we
also show that, for both SBDC and DBDC, calibrated and uncalibrated mean WTP
estimates are statistically different with the former being lower than the latter. Finally,
considering the most salient focus of this study, we provide statistical evidence sup-
porting the contention that calibration is effective at reducing internal inconsistency
between the single- and double-bounded welfare estimates in a DBDC contingent val-
uation study. In our application, the internal inconsistency is reduced by as much as
60 %. Furthermore, the double certainty calibration does not affect the efficiency gain
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arising from the second question. This fundamental result implies that researchers
wanting to explore the double certainty calibration to mitigate the internal inconsis-
tency in future CV studies will not need to worry about the efficiency gain inherent in
applying the DBDC approach.
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